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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals is conferred with jurisdiction over
the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e)
(2002) .

STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether appointed trial counsel denied Mr. Jacobsen of

the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel
by failing to request that prospective juror Progess be removed
for cause or failing to remove him by peremptory challenge.

To

make such a showing, a defendant must show, first, that counsel
rendered

a deficient

performance,

falling below

an objective

standard of reasonable professional judgment, and, second, that
Bundy

counsel's performance was prejudicial.
803 (Utah 1988).
matter of law.
Preservation
Issues

v. DeLand,

763 P. 2d

The appellate court reviews such a claim as a
State v. Maestas,

of Issue

involving

Citation

claims of

1999 UT 32, f20, 984 P.2d 376.

or Statement

of Grounds

for

Review:

ineffective

assistance

of

counsel

constitute an exception to the preservation rule and as such may
be raised for the first time on appeal.
2.

Whether the trial court committed plain error by not

pursuing the dismissal of prospective juror Progess similar to
that of the other prospective jurors.

1

In State

v.

Dunn,

850 P.2d

1201

(Utah 1993), this Court outlined the following principles

involved in determining whether "plain error" exists:
In general, to establish the existence of
plain error and to obtain appellate relief
from an alleged error that was not properly
objected to, the appellant must show the
following:
(1) An error exists; (11) the
error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (111) the error is harmful, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
the appellant, or phrased differently, our
confidence in the verdict is undermined.
Id.

at 1208-09.

Preservation
Issues

of Issue Citation

involving

plain

error

or Statement
constitute

of Grounds for Review:
an

exception

to the

preservation rule and as such may be raised for the first time on
appeal.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative,
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the failure to remove a prospective ^uror
for cause or by peremptory challenge.
Defendant of the right to a fair trial.

These failures precluded

Defendant was charged with Abuse or Neglect of a Disabled or
Elder Adult and Assault.

He pleaded not guilty to the charges.

Defendant subsequently appeared for a jury trial.

At the

conclusion of trial, Defendant was convicted on both counts.
On that same day, the trial court sentenced Defendant as
follows-

Based

on the conviction of Abuse

or Neglect

of a

Disabled or Elder Adult, the trial court sentenced Defendant to a
term of 365 days in the Davis County Jail, of which it suspended
325 days; and as to the conviction of Assault, the trial court
sentenced Defendant to a term of 180 days m
Jail, which the trial court suspended.

the Davis County

Defendant thereafter filed

a timely pro se notice of appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Mr. Jacobsen was charged with Abuse or Neglect of a

Disabled or Elder Adult in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5111(3) (a) , a class A misdemeanor, and Assault in violation of Utah
Code Ann.

§ 76-5-102, a class B misdemeanor

(R. 1-2).

See

Information, R. 1-2, a true and correct copy of which is attached
hereto as Addendum A.
2.

On September 29, 2 003, Mr. Jacobsen appeared before the

district court and pleaded not guilty (R. 10-11) .

3

3.

Mr. Jacobsen appeared for a jury trial on April 16, 2004

(R. 67-70) .
4.

During

prospective

jury

selection,

the

trial

court

asked

the

jurors whether any of them have close friends or

family members that work in law enforcement

(R. 117:18:19-20).

Prospective juror John Richard Progess responded that he had a
"close friend that's on the Utah Highway Patrol." (R. 117:21:1415) .
5.
inclined

The
to

trial
give

court

more

asked Mr. Progess

credibility

to

a

if he would

police

officer

u

be

who

testifies as opposed to a lay witness in court." (R. 117:22:1-3).
Mr. Progess responded, "I don't know if I'd give more credibility,
but I think they probably pay attention to detail a little bit
more than the average person." (R. 117:22:4-6).
6.

The trial court then inquired, "At this stage of the

proceedings, would your tendency be to favor the prosecution over
the defense?

(R. 117:22:7-8).

Mr. Progess responded,

u

No." (R.

117:22:9) .
7.

The

final

six persons

selected

to

sit

on the jury

included Mr. Progess (R. 117:39:14-16).
8.

At

the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Mr.

Jacobsen on both counts (R. 117:132:2-8).

4

9.

That same day, the trial court imposed sentence. (R.

68) . Based on the conviction of Abuse or Neglect of a Disabled or
Elder Adult, the trial court sentenced Mr. Jacobsen to a term of
365 days in the Davis County Jail, of which it suspended 325 days.
(R. 68).

As to the conviction of Assault,

sentenced Mr

the

trial court

Jacobsen to a term of 18 0 days in the Davis County

Jail, which the trial court suspended. (R. 68-69).

See Sentence,

Judgment, Commitment, R. 67-70, a true and correct copy of which
is attached hereto as Addendum B.
10.

Mr. Jacobsen filed a timely pro se notice of appeal (R.

71) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Trial counsel denied Mr. Jacobsen of his Sixth Amendment

right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing to request
that prospective juror Progess be removed for cause or failing to
remove him by peremptory challenge.

Trial counsel's failure to

request that Progess be removed for cause or failing to remove him
by peremptory

challenge

fell below

reasonable professional judgment.

an objective

standard of

The record demonstrates that

trial counsel was so inattentive or indifferent during the jury
selection process that the failure to remove Progess was not the
result of a conscious choice or preference.

5

In fact, except for

his brief introduction to the jury, trial counsel made no effort
to object or comment during jury selection.
But for counsel's unprofessional error of failing to request
that Progess be removed for cause or failing to remove him by
peremptory

challenge,

the

result

at

trial

would

have

been

different.

Had trial counsel objected, the trial court, based on

questioning utilized with other prospective jurors, would have
erred by not removing Progess.
2.

The trial court committed plain error by not pursuing

the dismissal of prospective juror Progess similar to that of the
other prospective jurors.

The brial court erred by failing to

pursue further questioning of and dismissal of prospective juror
Progess even though the trial court pursued such questioning of
and dismissal of other prospective jurors.

The error should have

been obvious in light of the dismissal of the other prospective
jurors during jury selection.

Finally, the error was harmful

because it denied Mr. Jacobsen of the right to a fair trial.

6

ARGUMENTS
I.

TRIAL COUNSEL DENIED MR, JACOBSEN OF HIS SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO REQUEST THAT PROSPECTIVE
JUROR PROGESS BE DISMISSED FOR CAUSE OR FOR
FAILING TO REMOVE HIM BY PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE.

In Strickland

v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct 2052

(1984), the United States Supreme Court established a two-prong
test for determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment1 right to
effective assistance of counsel has been denied.
S.Ct. at 2064.

Id.

at 687, 104

As adopted by Utah courts, this test requires a

defendant to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment
and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant."
Bundy

v.

Deland,

763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); State v.

899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State
P.2d

1113, 1119

(Utah Ct. App.

1995).

v. Wright,

" [T] he

Perry,
893

right to the

effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own
sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the
accused

to receive a fair trial," or, in this

x

case, a fair

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in
relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."
7

Lockhart

sentencing.

v. Fretwell,

506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct.

838, 842, (1993) .
To satisfy the first prong of the test, a defendant must
"xidentify the acts or omissions' which, under the circumstances,
x

show

that

counsel's

representation

standard of reasonableness.'"

State

(Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland,

fell

v.

below

Templin,

an

objective

805 P.2d 182, 186

466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct.

at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)).

A defendant must "overcome

the

counsel

strong

presumption

that

trial

rendered

adequate

assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment."

State

v.

497

Bullock,

791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, denied,

U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990).
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a
defendant

must

proffer

reasonable probability

sufficient

that, but

evidence

for counsel's

to

support

"a

unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different."
Strickland,
at 187.

466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin,

805 P.2d

"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome."
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons
1994); State

v.

Frame,

v. Barnes,

Strickland,

466 U.S. at

871 P. 2d 516, 522 (Utah

723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).

The appellate court presumes that trial counsel's lack of
objection to, or failure to remove, a particular juror was the
8

result of a plausibly justifiable conscious choice or preference.
See

Strickland

v.

Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052

However, the Strickland

(1984).

rebuttable.

presumption of effectiveness is

A defendant may rebut the presumption by showing:

(1) that trial counsel was so inattentive or indifferent during
the

jury

selection

process

that

the

failure

to

remove

a

prospective juror was not the product of a conscious choice or
preference; (2) that a prospective juror expressed bias so strong
or

unequivocal

that

no

plausible

countervailing

subjective

preference could justify failure to remove that juror; or (3) that
there is some other specific evidence clearly demonstrating that
trial counsel's choice was not plausibly justifiable.
Litherland,

State

v.

2000 UT 76, f25, 12 P.3d 92.

During jury selection in the instant case, the trial court
asked

the prospective

friends

or

family

117:18:19-20).

jurors whether

members

that

work

any of

them have close

in

enforcement

law

(R.

Prospective juror John Richard Progess responded

that he had a "close friend that's on the Utah Highway Patrol."
(R. 117:21:14-15).
The trial court asked Progess if he would "be inclined to
give more credibility to a police officer who testifies as opposed
to a lay witness in court." (R. 117:22:1-3).

Progess responded,

"I don't know if I'd give more credibility, but I think they
9

probably pay attention to detail

a little bit more

than the

average person." (R. 117:22:4-6).
The

trial

court

then

inquired,

"At

this

stage

of

the

proceedings, would your tendency be to favor the prosecution over
the

defense?

117:22:9)

(R.

117:22:7-8).

Progess

responded,

"No."

(R.

The final six persons selected to sit on the jury

included Progess (R. 117:39:14-16), who ultimately served as the
foreperson

of

the

jury

who

convicted

Mr.

Jacobsen

(R. 57,

Verdict).
Trial counsel's failure to request that Progess be removed
for cause or failing to remove him by peremptory challenge fell
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment.
The record demonstrates that trial counsel was so inattentive or
indifferent during the jury selection process that the failure to
remove

Progess was

preference.

not

the

result

of

a conscious

choice

or

In fact, except for the brief introduction of himself

to the jury, trial counsel made no effort to object or otherwise
comment during jury selection.
But for counsel's unprofessional error of failing to request
that Progess be removed for cause or failing to remove him by
peremptory

challenge,

the

result

at

trial

would

different.

Had trial counsel objected, the trial court, based on

questioning utilized with other prospective jurors (see
10

have

been

R. 117:22-

23 (prospective juror Munson); R. 117:27:4-12 (prospective juror
Johnson); R. 117:30-31 (prospective juror Northrop),2 would have
erred by not removing Progess.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY NOT
PURSUING THE DISMISSAL OF PROSPECTIVE JUROR
PROGESS SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE OTHER PROSPECTIVE
JURORS.

In State

v.

Dunn,

850 P.2d

1201

(Utah 1993), this Court

outlined the following principles involved in determining whether
"plain error'' exists:
In general, to establish the existence of
plain error and to obtain appellate relief
from an alleged error that was not properly
objected to, the appellant must show the
following:
(i) An error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
the appellant, or phrased differently, our
confidence in the verdict is undermined.
Id.

at 1208-09; see

also

State

(Utah Ct. App. 1996); and State
App. 1996) .

v.

Portillo,

v. Tenney,

According to State

v.

Verde,

914 P.2d 724, 726
913 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct.
770 P.2d 116, 121-22

(Utah 1989), "in most circumstances, the term 'manifest injustice'
[found in Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)] is synonymous with the 'plain

2

A portion of the jury selection proceedings is attached hereto
as Addendum C. See also Argument II, pages 12 through 13.
11

error' standard expressly provided in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d)

In the instant case, the trial court erred by failing to
pursue further questioning of and dismissal of prospective juror
Progess even though the trial court pursued such questioning of
and dismissal of other prospective jurors.

The error should have

been obvious in light of the dismissal of the other prospective
jurors during jury selection.

For example, prospective juror Bart

Alan Munson informed the trial court that he had worked with
several Farmington City police and that he is close friends with
others from the sheriff's office

(R. 117:22:12-15).

The court

then asked him if he would "be more inclined at this stage to give
their testimony more credibility simply because they're with the
Davis County Sheriff's Office?"

(R. 117:22:17-19).

To which

Munson responded, "I don't think so." (R. 117:22:20).

The trial

court questioned Munson further by asking, "If you were seated
here at defense table as the defendant, and somebody is in the
jury with a close relationship between an agency who will be
testifying

in

117:23:6-9).

that

trial,

would

you

be

uncomfortable?"

(R.

Munson responded, "Yeah, I think so.", after which

the court excused Munson (R. 117:23:10-14).

Moreover, the trial

court released prospective juror Jessica R. Carlos upon being
informed that she could "possibly" be influenced by the fact that

12

her brother-in-law is an officer for Sunset City (R. 117:26:1125).

Finally, the error was harmful because denied Mr. Jacobsen

of the right to a fair trial.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Jacobsen respectfully requests
that this Court reverse and remand the case to the district court
for a new trial and for any further proceedings consistent with
this Court's instructions as set forth in its opinion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of February, 2006.
ARNOLD fc WIGGINS, P.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused
to be mailed by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the
following on this 5
day of March, 2006:
Mr. Brandon L. Poll
Deputy Davis County Attorney
800 West State Street
P.O. Box 618
Farmington, UT 84 02 5
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Tab A

MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
P.O. Box 618
800 West State Street
Farmington UT 84025
Telephone: (801)451-4300
Fax:
(801)451-4328
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
Bail:

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.
RONALD KENT JACOBSEN
DOB: 05/01/1954,
Defendant.

INFORMATION
Case No.

OTN14237184

ICU

The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief that the defendant, on
or about September 26, 2003 at County of Davis, State of Utah, committed the crimes of:
COUNT 1
ABUSE OR NEGLECT OF A DISABLED OR ELDER ADULT, (173) 76-5111 (3)(a) UCA, class A misdemeanor, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the
defendant under circumstances other than those likely to produce death or serious physical
injury, intentionally or knowingly caused a disabled or elder adult to suffer physical injury,
abuse, or neglect.
COUNT 2
ASSAULT, (6) 76-5-102 UCA, class B misdemeanor, as follows: That at the
time and place aforesaid the defendant did attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily
injury to another; did threaten, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or did commit an act, with unlawful force or violence, that caused
bodily injury to another or created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.

This information is based on evidence obtained from witness Phil Rogers.
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: The undersigned prosecutor is a Deputy
Davis County Attorney and has received information from the investigating officer, Phil Rogers
of the North Salt Lake Police Department, and the Information herein is based upon such
personal observations and investigation of said officer.
On September 26, 2003 defendant assaulted the victim, a disabled adult, hitting
him in the face and chest.
Authorized September 29, 2003.
for presentment and filing:
MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis Cdunty Attorney

Deputy Davis County Attorney

TabB

SLED
AHK 2 I 2004
SECOND
DISTRICT nnng-r
2nd District - Farmington COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
JURY TRIAL
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 031701596 MO

RONALD KENT JACOBSEN,
Defendant,
Custody: DCJ

Judge:
Date:

DARWIN C. HANSEN
April 16, 2004

PRESENT
Clerk:
karensd
Prosecutor: POLL, BRANDON L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): ARRINGTON, C MARKLEY
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: May 1, 1954
Video
Tape Count: 9:05

Criminal Sentence, Judgment, Commitment @J

031701596

JD11595036
JACOBSEN,RONALD KENT

CHARGES
1. ABUSE OF DISABLED OR ELDER ADULT - Class A Misdemeanor
- Disposition: 04/16/2004 Guilty
2. SIMPLE ASSAULT - Class B Misdemeanor
- Disposition: 04/16/2004 Guilty
TRIAL
Oath to Jurors on Voir Dire Examination is administered.
Jury selection concludes.
Brandon Poll, prosecutor for the State, introduces himself and
lists his witnesse.
Mr. Arrington introduces himself and lists potential witnesses.
Counsel pass the jury for cause.
Premptory challenge is administered and the jury is selected.
Oath to jurors impaneled to try a case is administered.
Court takes a recess and reconvenes at 10:31 a.m.
Preliminary jury instructions are given.
Page 1

Case No: 031701596
Date:
Apr 16, 2004
The Information is read.
Mr. Poll makes opening statements to the Court.
Mr. Arrington makes opening statements to the Court.
State's witness Ronald G. Jacobsen Sr. is sworn and testifies.
Cross examination by Mr. Arrington.
The witness is excused.
State's witness Phil Rogers is sworn and testifies.
States exhibit 4, 2, 3, 1 are offered and received.
Cross examination by Mr. Arrington.
The witness is excused.
The State rests.
The Court takes a lunch break at 11:49 and reconvenes at 1:22 p.m.
Mr. Arrington states they will have no witnesses testify and they
rest their case.
Jury instructions are given.
Court recesses at 1:31 and reconvenes at 1:38.
Mr. Poll gives closing statements.
Mr. Arrington gives closing statements.
The Oath is given to the Bailiff.
The Jury leaves to begin deliberations at 2:40 p.m.
Court reconvenes at 3:25 p.m.
The verdict is read and when polled, the jury's decision was
unanimous.
Defendant is found guilty on both counts. Defendant waives the
waiting period and requests sentencing today.
The State recommends Defendant be ordered into alcohol treatment
and there is a concern as to where Defendant will live upon
release. They recommend a period of time before he returns to the
home of his parents. The original order of no contact was
lifted in October. Defendant has served 35 days in the Davis
County Jail. He failed to appear in November 2003 and a warrant
was issued. He's been in jail since arrested because of failure to
make bail.
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of ABUSE OF DISABLED OR ELDER
ADULT a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term
of 365 day(s) in the Davis County Jail. The total time suspended
for this charge is 325 day(s).
Based on the defendant's conviction of SIMPLE ASSAULT a Class B
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) in
the Davis County Jail. The total time suspended for this charge is
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180 day(s).
Commitment is to begin immediately.
Credit is granted for time served.
Credit is granted for 35 day(s) previously served.
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:
Fine:
Suspended:

$8050.00
$7550.00
$243.24
$500.00
$1850.00
$1850.00

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$9900.00
$9400.00
$243.24
$500.00

Charge # 2

Plus Interest
SCHEDULED TIMEPAY
The following cases are on timepay 031701596.
The defendant is to pay $50.00 monthly on the 30th.
The number of payments scheduled is 9.
The first payment is due on 5/30/2004 the final payment of .$58.18
is due on 02/28/2005. The final payment may vary based on
interest.
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 18 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by POSITIVE ADJUSTMENTS.
Defendant to serve 40 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to report to the Davis County Jail.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 500.00 which includes the surcharge.
Interest may increase the final amount due.
Pay fine to The Court.
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PROBATION CONDITIONS
CONDUCT: Commit no further violations of the law.
ALCOHOL: Do not use or possess alcoholic beverages or frequent
places where alcohol is the chief item for sale.
EVALUATION: Evaluation by Davis County Alcohol and Drug or Davis
County Behavioral Health and successful completion of any program
that they suggest.
PROGRAM/TREATMENT: Enter, participate in and complete any program,
counseling or treatment as directed by AP&P.
OTHER: Do not purchase alcohol for the victim.
SENTENCE PROBATION SERVICE NOTE
If Defendant has an alcohol related violation, the Court will
consider this a violation of probation and it will be a much
harsher punishment. If antebuse is recommended, Defendant is to
comply with this recommendation.
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1

MS. MANGRUM: No.

2

THE COURT: All right.

Do you feel like you could

3

give fair consideration to both sides if you're called to serve

4

on this jury?

5

MS. MANGRUM: Yes.

6

THE COURT:

7

Anyone else on the back row?

8

All right.

9
10

Thank you very much.

We're talking about close friends or

family members who work in law enforcement.
there were some hands I know.

Mr. — is it Progess?

11

MR. PROGESS: Progess.

12

THE COURT: All right.

13

MR. PROGESS:

Yes.

On the front row

Thank you.

I have a good friend that's a

14

corporate lawyer, and a good friend that's on the Utah Highway

15

Patrol.

16

THE COURT: All right.

I take it your good friend

17

who's a corporate lawyer really doesn't get involved in the

18

criminal law then, especially.

19

MR. PROGESS: No, sir.

20

THE COURT:

Your friend on the Highway Patrol I

21

expect probably does —

22

MR. PROGESS:

23

THE COURT: -- and probably testifies in court f

24
25

Yes.

time to time.
MR. PROGESS:

Yes, sir.
21

1

THE COURT:

Therefore, would you be inclined to give

2

more credibility to a police officer who testifies as opposed

3

to a lay witness in court?

4

MR. PROGESS:

I don't know if I'd give more

5 I credibility, but I think they probably pay attention to detail
6 I a little bit more than the average person.
7
8
9

THE COURT:

your tendency be to favor the prosecution over the defense?
MR. PROGESS:

10

THE COURT:

11

Mr. Munson.

12

MR. MUNSON:

13

At this stage of the proceedings, would

No.

All right.

Anyone else on the front row?

Because I work at Lagoon, I work with —

have worked with several Farmington City police and also the

14 | sheriff, and three in particular are pretty close friends from
15
16 I

the Davis County sheriff's department.
THE COURT:

Okay.

We're going to have some Davis

17

County sheriff people testify.

18

inclined at this stage to give their testimony more credibility

19

simply because they're with the Davis County Sheriff's Office?

20

MR. MUNSON:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. ?: (inaudible).

23

THE COURT:

Are you going to be more

I don't think so.
Can I pursue that a bit?

Let me ask you a question, if I may, and

24

again I ask you this just because all of us are nothing more

25

than the sum total of our life's experience.

We have friends
22

1

from all different walks of life, and so sometimes it's hard

2

for us to evaluate where we are in this circumstance we find

3

ourselves in today where we may be called upon to serve on a

4

jury.

5

So with those comments by way of a predicate, let me

6

give you a hypothetical.

If you were seated here at defense

7

table as the defendant, and somebody is in the jury with a

8

close relationship between an agency who will be testifying in

9

that trial, would you be uncomfortable?
i

10

MR. MUNSON:

Yeah, I think so.

!
i

11

THE COURT:

I appreciate your candor.

My sense is

12

that if it were me, I probably would be, too.

13

the appropriate thing to do is, Mr. Munson, excuse you, if you i

14

don't mind —

15

MR. MUNSON:

16

THE COURT:

So what I think ;

J
Okay.

j

- and we'll call another to take your

|

17

place.

And I say that not in terms of any negative fashion,

I

18

but just the fact that your experience, given the nature of

19

this case, probably suggests that maybe somebody that has some

20

other kind of experience would be better suited to be on the

i

i

21

jury, whereas in another circumstance, that may be a case where |

22

you ought to be on the jury.

23
24

taking this action.
MR. MUNSON:

25

THE COURT:

So I hope you don't mind our

Okay.
Thank you very much.

23

MR. POLL:

And, your Honor, we don't have any

witnesses from the Davis County sheriff's office.
THE COURT:

Well, I understand that, but you have

police officers here in Davis County.
MR. POLL:

That's correct.

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

Let's proceed.

THE CLERK:

Chantelle Schow.

THE COURT:

Ms. Schow, let us catch you up, please.

Would you answer the questions on the white board?
MS. SCHOW:
Clinton.

My name is Chantelle Schow.

I'm married.

I live in

I have two children, six and three.

have a high-school education.

I am currently a homemaker.

husband is in network information.

I
My

And in my spare time I like

to read, play with my children, and networking.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Please be seated.

Are you

acquainted with Mr. Poll or any witnesses whom he introduced?
MS. SCHOW:

No.

THE COURT:

Or Mr. Arrington or the defendant in this

MS. SCHOW:

No.

THE COURT:

Have you heard anything about the case

case?

from any source?
MS. SCHOW:

No.

THE COURT:

Have you served on a jury in the past?

MS. SCHOW:

No.
24

THE COURT:

Do you have any difficulty in given us

your best effort during this one day of trial?
MS. SCHOW:

No.

THE COURT:

All right.

Do you have a close friend or

family member that's ever been the victim of a crime?
MS. SCHOW

No.

THE COURT

Or charged with a crime?

MS. SCHOW

I have a brother that was charged with a

THE COURT:

All right.

MS. SCHOW:

Three years ago.

THE COURT:

And was that handled as part of the

DUI,
How long ago was that?

judicial system?
MS. SCHOW:

It was settled out of court.

THE COURT:

All right.

Was there anything about that

that would cause you to have any negative feelings about the
judicial system?
MS. SCHOW:

No.

THE COURT:

Or would it cause you to favor one side

over the other at this stage in this case?
MS. SCHOW:

No.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

Do you have any

friends or family members that work in law enforcement?
MS. SCHOW:

I have a brother that works at Box Elder.

THE COURT:

As a sheriff?

25

1

MS. SCHOW:

No.

Juvenile work.

2

THE COURT:

So he's in the juvenile system?

3

MS. SCHOW:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

4

THE COURT:

Would that cause you in this trial to

5

favor a police officer's testimony over a non-police officer's

6

testimony simply because they're a police officer?

7

MS. SCHOW:

No.

8

THE COURT:

All right.

9
10

12

come back to you, Mr. Johnson.

13

MS. CARLOS:

Let's go to Ms. Carlos, and then we'll

My brother-in-law is an officer for

Sunset City.

15

THE COURT:

All right.

And the same questions then

16

would apply in your case..

17

favor one side over the other at this stage?

18

MS. CARLOS:

19

THE COURT:

20

MS. CARLOS:

Yes.

21

THE COURT:

Okay.

Does that cause you in this case to

Well, I - I mean possibly.
Is that the reason for your hesitancy?

So you think maybe it would

influence you?

23

MS. CARLOS:

24

THE COURT:

25

Is

association with law-enforcement people?
All right.

22

All right.

there anyone else that we haven't talked to that had

11

14

Thank you.

candor.

Possibly yeah, it would.
All right.

Again, I appreciate your

We'll excuse you, Ms. Carlos.
26

Now, before we call another to take your place, let
me just talk for a minute to you, Mr. Johnson.

What's your

knowledge or friendship with law-enforcement people?
MR. JOHNSON:

I have friends in Kaysville City that

work for Kaysville — Layton also on the UHP.
THE COURT:

All right.

And again, would that cause

you to favor the testimony of a police officer in the sense
that you would give that officer more credibility simply
because they're police officers?
MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:
Mr. Johnson.

I do believe so.
I'm going to release you, too,

Thank you.

And I'll ask the clerk to call two names.

The first

will take the place of Ms. Carlos, the second Mr. Johnson.
THE CLERK:

Kathleen Marie White.

THE COURT:

Ms. White, if you would be seated where

Ms. Carlos was seated, we would appreciate that.
THE CLERK:

And Melanie Ann MacFarlane.

THE COURT:

And Ms. MacFarlane, please be seated in

Mr. Johnson's chair.
catch you up.

And if we may, ladies, we'll want to

Let's start with you, Ms. MacFarlane.

Would you

answer the questions on the white board, please?
MR. MacFARLANE:
live in Sunset.

Yeah.

I'm single.

I'm Melanie MacFarlane.

I

I have a high-school diploma.

work at the driver's license division in Brigham City.

I

And I
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1

like to read (inaudible).

2

THE COURT:

3

All right.

Thank you very much.

Ms. White, likewise would you answer those questions?

4

MS. WHITE:

I'm Kathleen White.

I live in Layton.

5

I'm married.

6

my junior year of college, theater-arts major.

7

now.

8

Hill Air Force Base.

9

fiction and fantasy.

10 I

I have an eleven-year-old daughter.

THE COURT:

And spare time, I like reading science

All right.

Thank you.

you two ladies together, if I may.

12

Mr. Poll or the persons whom he introduced?

13

MS. WHITE:

14

MS. MacFARLANE:

15

THE COURT:

Now, let me ask

Do either of you know

No.
No.

Do you know Mr. Arrington or the

defendant in this case.

17

MS. MacFARLANE:

18

MS. WHITE:

No.

19

THE COURT:

All right.

20

I'm a homemaker

My spouse's occupation is a technical engineer at

11

16

I finished

No.

Have either of you heard

anything about the case from any source?

21

MS. MacFARLANE:

22

MS. WHITE:

No.

23

THE COURT:

Have either of you been on a jury in the

MS. WHITE:

No.

24
25

past?

No.

1

MS. MacFARLANE:

2 |

THE COURT:

No.

Okay.

Do either of you have difficulty
!

3

giving us your best efforts today during this one-day trial?

4

MS. WHITE:

5

MS. MacFARLANE: No.

6

THE COURT:

No.

All right.

Thank you.

Do either of you

7

have a close friend or family member that's ever been the

8

victim of a crime or been charged with a crime?.

9

MS. MacFARLANE:

10

MS. WHITE:

No.

11

THE COURT:

Okay.

No.

Do either of you have close

12

friends or family members that work in law enforcement?

13

the answer is no.

14 |

All right.

And

Thank you.

Now, is there anyone else on the law-enforcement

15

issue that I've overlooked here?

16

M s . Mangrum.

17

MS. MANGRUM:

When he was introducing the officers,

18

there was an officer I noticed in the courtroom, but I didn't

19

hear his name called with the two officers.

20
21

THE COURT:

Could you indicate the witnesses,

Mr. Poll?

22

MR. POLL:

23

Andrew Bryson.

24

here.

25

i

Our two officers are Phil Rogers and

There was another officer that was briefly in

It was John Herndon.
MS. MANGRUM:

He's not a witness.

I've seen John Herndon, I think 29 j

1

THE COURT:

Okay.

2

MS. MANGRUM:

3

THE COURT:

4

Ladies and gentlemen, let me move to one other area

- in the paper.
All right.

Thank you.

I

j

5

then, if I may, that deals with criminal law, and I'm going to j

6

ask this question to the panel as a whole.

7

criminal justice, when a person is charged with a criminal

8

offense, they are presumed to be innocent until they're proven

9

guilty by the prosecution, and the nature of that proof must be

In our system of

10

beyond a reasonable doubt.

11

charged with a crime, as a matter of law they are presumed to

12

be innocent until the prosecution overcomes that presumption.

13

So the fact that a person is

So is there any of you that cannot give the defendant

14

the presumption of innocence as you see him today seated here

15

at defense counsel table?

16

cannot do that, would you please raise your hand?

17

Thank you very much.

18

If there are any of you who feel you
All right.

Now, you've heard me ask a number of you about police

19

officers.

20

this question hasn't been given to all of you.

21

on the panel who would believe or feel that the testimony of a

22

police officer, simply for that reason only, is more credible a

23

lay-witness person who testifies?

24
25

I'm going to ask this to the whole panel because
Is there anyone

If so raise your hand.

Mr. Northrop.
MR. NORTHROP:

I would think so just because they're
30

iii ; ne s y s t e m m o r e and t h e y ' r e m o r e a r o u n d
UU:.: .: ;:t.'SS .
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i

THE COURT:

-. : . "-

call another

:

:'-.'>:

C l t M i l . ;•:.

We:-.i . , • appreciate your —

THE COURT:
sir, Dii' I thin)-

.;

' M i s L^nci o f

appreciate ycur comment, aoout that,

' ' r- go: ng to excuse you f if I m a y , and we'll

>( take your p l a c e .

THE CLERK:

Pussell Jay Y a h n e .

T H E COI JR"

*

,K

,\x

chair, p l e a s e ?
Ml-!, OOOPEP;
THE COURT :

'\rt'' yon M :-i k i n« < im I ' « leave?
Oh, i i< : • , I • m i lot

Mr . N o r t h r o p .

I'm,.

sorry, M r . C o o p e r .
MI<' . OOOPEP i
THE COURT:

W<•! ! , 1 a m i d ubi i ge .
That w a s close, huh?

AJ 1 right.

h i 1 ci i 1 o \ / ci o ;y c i i p: r o i I o i 11 I c e y o i i r i I a n: i e , s :i r ?
MR

YAHNE:

Yahne.

THE COI JRT i

Yahne ?

-

•

,c ,

/ • ] ] 1 lave

to catch y o u u p . Wou1d you answer t h e questions on the white
board, p l e a s e ?
Ml
Layton, Utah

YAHNE:

ukay.

i' in married.

M y name is Jay l ahne.

I I i ve i n

I have o n e d a u g h t e r , seven months.

My edi icat i on i s I have a master '" s degree

• • . or J : < >.,I _,: j ,

My o c c u p a t i o n is I own a geotechnical e n g i n e e r i n g firm in
Layton.

My w i f e ' s occi ipati on i s si le 'works part t.i me w:i tl i me :n
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